We collect data on prices, travel costs, and farmer decisions to quantify market access for chemical fertilizer and its impact on agricultural productivity in 1,180 villages in Northern Tanzania. Villages at the bottom of the travel cost-adjusted input price distribution face 40%–55% less favorable prices than those at the top. A standard deviation increase in village-level remoteness is associated with 20%–25% lower input adoption. A spatial model of input adoption conservatively estimates that total trade costs are 4 times pecuniary travel costs. Counterfactuals suggest that halving travel costs would more than double adoption and reduce the adoption-remoteness gradient by 63%.

A party’s influence over redistricting increases discontinuously when its seat share in the state legislature exceeds 50%. We apply bunching tests to show that, in the election before redistricting, parties systematically win narrow majorities in legislatures of states where they have lost recent U.S. House races. This trend of losses is reversed after redistricting despite no change in overall House vote shares in states near the cutoff. The pre-to-post-redistricting change in regression discontinuity estimates implies that the party that controls redistricting engineers an 11 percentage point increase in its probability of winning a House race.