This paper explores whether lobbies slow down technology diffusion. To answer this question, we exploit the differential effect of various institutional attributes that should affect the costs of erecting barriers when the new technology has a technologically close predecessor but not otherwise. We implement this test using a data set that covers the diffusion of twenty technologies for 23 countries over the past two centuries. We find that each of the relevant institutional variables that affect the costs of erecting barriers has a significantly larger effect on the diffusion of technologies with a competing predecessor technology than when no such technology exists. These effects are quantitatively important. Thus, we conclude that lobbies are an important barrier to technology adoption and to development.

This note documents the diverging trends in volatility of the growth rate of sales at the aggregate and firm levels. We establish that the upward trend in firm volatility is not simply driven by a compositional bias in the sample studied.We argue that this new fact brings into question the proposed explanations for the decline in aggregate volatility and that, given the symmetry of the diverging trends at the micro and macro levels, a common explanation is likely. We conclude by describing one such theory.