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Hongbin Cai
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Journal Articles
The Effect of Microinsurance on Economic Activities: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment
UnavailablePublisher: Journals Gateway
The Review of Economics and Statistics (2015) 97 (2): 287–300.
Published: 01 May 2015
Abstract
View articletitled, The Effect of Microinsurance on Economic Activities: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment
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for article titled, The Effect of Microinsurance on Economic Activities: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment
We report results from a large, randomized field to study how access to formal microinsurance affects production and economic development. We induce exogenous variation in insurance coverage at the village level by randomly assigning performance incentives to the village animal husbandry worker who is responsible for signing farmers up for the insurance. We find that promoting greater adoption of insurance significantly increases farmers' sow production, and this effect seems to persist in the longer run; moreover, the increase in sow production in response to the sow insurance does not seem to be the result of the substitution of other livestock.
Includes: Supplementary data
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
The Review of Economics and Statistics (2013) 95 (3): 850–867.
Published: 01 July 2013
Abstract
View articletitled, Family Ties and Organizational Design: Evidence from Chinese Private Firms
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for article titled, Family Ties and Organizational Design: Evidence from Chinese Private Firms
Analyzing data from a unique survey of managers of Chinese private firms, we investigate how family ties with firm heads affect managerial compensation and job assignment. We find that family managers earn higher salaries and receive more bonuses, hold higher positions, and are given more decision rights and job responsibilities than nonfamily managers in the same firm. However, family managers face weaker incentives than professional managers, as seen in the lower sensitivity of their bonuses to firm performance. Our findings are consistent with the predictions of a principal-agent model that incorporates family trust and endogenous job assignment decisions.