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Hyuncheol Bryant Kim
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Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
The Review of Economics and Statistics 1–49.
Published: 05 March 2025
Abstract
View articletitled, Is Job Loss Always Bad for Health? Evidence from National Health Screening
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for article titled, Is Job Loss Always Bad for Health? Evidence from National Health Screening
We examine the effect of job displacement on mortality, hospitalization, biomarkers, and health behaviors in South Korea. We find that the impact on health differs between severe and less severe outcomes and also by gender. Men experience little impact on mortality and hospitalization except for an increase in suicide deaths, whereas their biomarkers and health behaviors improve. Women experience an increase in mortality and hospitalization due to cancer, but no significant effects on biomarkers or health behaviors. The study emphasizes the need to consider a comprehensive range of outcomes to accurately evaluate the effect of job loss on health.
Includes: Supplementary data
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
The Review of Economics and Statistics (2020) 102 (5): 839–851.
Published: 01 December 2020
FIGURES
Abstract
View articletitled, The Role of Career and Wage Incentives in Labor Productivity: Evidence from a Two-Stage Field Experiment in Malawi
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for article titled, The Role of Career and Wage Incentives in Labor Productivity: Evidence from a Two-Stage Field Experiment in Malawi
We study how career and wage incentives affect labor productivity through self-selection and incentive effect channels using a two-stage field experiment in Malawi. First, recent secondary school graduates were hired with either career or wage incentives. After employment, half of the workers with career incentives randomly received wage incentives, and half of the workers with wage incentives randomly received career incentives. Career incentives attract higher-performing workers than wage incentives do, but they do not increase productivity conditional on selection. Wage incentives increase productivity for those recruited through career incentives. Observable characteristics are limited in explaining selection effects of entry-level workers.
Includes: Supplementary data