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Ignacio Palacios-Huerta
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Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
The Review of Economics and Statistics (2024) 106 (2): 409–422.
Published: 19 March 2024
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We connect two large bodies of scientific inquiry. First, important theories in the social sciences establish that human preferences are reference-dependent. Second, a separate field of research documents substantial differences in preferences and attitudes across genders. Specifically, we examine the universe of official classic chess games (more than 250,000 subjects and 22 million games). This allows us to study differences across genders both in cognitive performance (intensive margin) and in competitive participation (extensive margin), using the fact that personal bests act as reference points. We find that males and females behave very differently around their personal bests in both margins.
Includes: Supplementary data
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
The Review of Economics and Statistics (2014) 96 (3): 524–537.
Published: 01 July 2014
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Understanding when and how individuals think about real-life problems is a central question in economics. This paper studies the role of inertia (inattention), state dependence, and learning. The empirical setting is a tariff experiment, when optional measured tariffs for local telephone calls were introduced unanticipatedly. We find that consumers tend to align their choices of tariff and telephone use levels correctly. Despite low potential savings, mistakes are not permanent, as individuals actively engage in tariff switching in order to reduce the monthly cost of telephone service. Ignoring unobservable heterogeneity and the endogeneity of past choices would have reversed these results.
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
The Review of Economics and Statistics (2005) 87 (2): 208–216.
Published: 01 May 2005
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This paper is concerned with the effect of nonmonetary incentives on behavior, in particular with the study of social pressure as a determinant of corruption. We offer empirical evidence that shows how professional soccer referees favor home teams in order to satisfy the crowds in the stadium. Referees have discretion over the addition of extra time at the end of a soccer game to compensate for lost time due to unusual stoppages. We find that referees systematically favor home teams by shortening close games where the home team is ahead, and lengthening close games where the home team is behind. They show no such bias for games that are not close. We further find that when the rewards for winning games increase, referees change their bias accordingly. Lastly, we identify that the mechanism through which bias operates is to satisfy the crowd, by documenting how the size and composition of the crowd affect referee favoritism.