This paper studies the influence of R&D in the U.S. federal laboratory system, the world's largest, on firm research. Our results are based on a sample of 220 industrial research laboratories that work with a variety of federal laboratories and agencies and are owned by 115 firms in the chemicals, machinery, electrical equipment, and motor vehicles industries. Using an indicator of their importance to R&D managers, we find that cooperative research and development agreements (CRADAs) dominate other channels of technology transfer from federal laboratories to firms. With a CRADA industry laboratories patent more, spend more on company-financed R&D, and devote more resources to their federal counterparts. Without this influence, patenting stays about the same, and only federally funded R&D increases, mostly because of government support. The Stevenson-Wydler Act and amendments during the 1980s introduced CRADAs, which legally bind federal laboratories and firms together in joint research. In theory the agreements could capitalize on complementarities between public and private research. Our results support this perspective and suggest that CRADAs may be more beneficial to firms than other interactions with federal laboratories, precisely because of the mutual effort that they demand from both parties.

This paper explores the effect of research and development (R&D) and capital on factor intensity and skill bias in a sample of manufacturing plants. Firm and industry R&D as well as plant level capital increase the factor intensity of labor over materials. In contrast, skill bias originates in portions of capital and R&D. Equipment capital and firm R&D in the same product as a plant are consistently skill biased, while structures are biased against skill. Furthermore, general firm and industry R&D increase investment in equipment but not structures. This shows that the skill bias of R&D occurs through two distinct channels. First, firm R&D specific to the product increases the relative demand for skilled labor directly and in the short run through the cost function. Second, general firm and industry R&D exert an additional skill bias by favoring equipment over structures in the long run, demonstrating the broader compass of the skill bias of R&D over time.