Skip Nav Destination
Close Modal
Update search
NARROW
Format
Journal
Date
Availability
1-1 of 1
John H. Kagel
Close
Follow your search
Access your saved searches in your account
Would you like to receive an alert when new items match your search?
Sort by
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
The Review of Economics and Statistics (2001) 83 (3): 408–419.
Published: 01 August 2001
Abstract
View article
PDF
Super-experienced bidders have learned to overcome the winner's curse but still earn less than 50% of Nash equilibrium profits. Subjects deviate from the complicated Nash strategy, employing piecewise-linear bid functions that are capable, in principle, of generating an equilibrium with average profits at or above the Nash benchmark. Thus, limited computational abilities alone cannot account for the reduced earnings. Further, subjects are far from best responding within this family of piecewise-linear bid functions. Alternative factors contributing to these reduced earnings are explored.