Economic development implies that the efficiency of firms in developing countries starts approaching that of firms from advanced economies. Various development policies have been pursued to achieve this convergence. We test for this convergence in two economies that represent alternative models of implementing market-oriented development policies: the Czech Republic and Russia. Using 1992–2000 panel data on virtually all medium and large industrial firms in each country and accounting for endogeneity of ownership, we find that foreign ownership markedly improved the efficiency of firms, whereas domestic private ownership did not; domestic firms are not catching up to the (world) efficiency standard given by foreign-owned firms. This is due in part to a slower growth of efficiency in domestic firms over time. However, foreigners' acquisitions of more efficient domestic firms are also contributing to the gap. Domestic firms closer to the frontier are not more likely to catch up than firms farther from the frontier, although foreign firms do exhibit this behavior. The distance of Russian firms to the efficiency frontier is much larger than that of Czech firms. Nevertheless, after nearly a decade of reforms, neither model of development has resulted in convergence of domestic firms to the world standard.

We present and estimate a model with strategic complementarities in firms' choices of on-time or delayed wage payment. Linked employer-employee panel data from Russia facilitate identification of the endogenous interactions through fixed effects for firms, workers, and local labor markets, and instrumental variables based on policy interventions. The estimated reaction function displays strongly positive neighborhood effects, and the estimated feedback loops—worker quits, effort, strikes, and legal penalties—imply that costs of wage delays are attenuated by neighborhood arrears. We also study a nonlinear case with two stable symmetric equilibria: a punctual payment and a late payment equilibrium.