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Li-An Zhou
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Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
The Review of Economics and Statistics (2020) 102 (5): 897–911.
Published: 01 December 2020
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This paper develops a theoretical framework to study the critical role that politics play in shaping the spatial dimension of China's urbanization and the related welfare implications. Utilizing a large data set of residential land transactions matched with city leaders in 200 Chinese cities from 2000 through 2011, the empirical analysis finds that a 1 standard deviation increase in the career-incentive measure leads to 9 additional kilometers of outward expansion, a 23% increase relative to the sample average. It also finds some suggestive evidence pointing to the distortionary impacts of overly strong incentives of city leaders on spatial expansion, consistent with the theory.
Includes: Supplementary data
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
The Review of Economics and Statistics (2015) 97 (2): 287–300.
Published: 01 May 2015
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We report results from a large, randomized field to study how access to formal microinsurance affects production and economic development. We induce exogenous variation in insurance coverage at the village level by randomly assigning performance incentives to the village animal husbandry worker who is responsible for signing farmers up for the insurance. We find that promoting greater adoption of insurance significantly increases farmers' sow production, and this effect seems to persist in the longer run; moreover, the increase in sow production in response to the sow insurance does not seem to be the result of the substitution of other livestock.
Includes: Supplementary data
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
The Review of Economics and Statistics (2013) 95 (3): 850–867.
Published: 01 July 2013
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Analyzing data from a unique survey of managers of Chinese private firms, we investigate how family ties with firm heads affect managerial compensation and job assignment. We find that family managers earn higher salaries and receive more bonuses, hold higher positions, and are given more decision rights and job responsibilities than nonfamily managers in the same firm. However, family managers face weaker incentives than professional managers, as seen in the lower sensitivity of their bonuses to firm performance. Our findings are consistent with the predictions of a principal-agent model that incorporates family trust and endogenous job assignment decisions.