In markets with asymmetric information between sellers and buyers, feedback mechanisms are important to increase market efficiency and reduce the informational disadvantage of buyers. Feedback mechanisms might work because of self-selection of more trustworthy sellers into markets with such mechanisms or because of reputational concerns of sellers. We show in a field experiment how to disentangle self-selection from reputation effects. Based on 476 taxi rides with four different types of taxis, we find strong evidence for reputation effects, but little support for self-selection effects. We discuss policy implications of our findings.

Income inequalities within societies are often associated with evidence that the rich are more likely to behave unethically and evade more taxes. We study how fairness views and preferences for redistribution are affected when cheating may, but need not, be the cause of income inequalities. In our experiment, we let third parties redistribute income between a rich and a poor stakeholder. In one treatment, income inequality was only due to luck, while in two others rich stakeholders might have cheated. The mere suspicion of cheating changes third parties' fairness views considerably and leads to a strong polarization that is even more pronounced when cheating generates negative externalities.

We examine how preplay communication and clustering affect play in a challenging hybrid experimental game on networks. Free-form chat is impressively effective in achieving the nonequilibrium efficient outcome, but restricted communication has little effect. We support this result with a model about the credibility of cheap-talk messages. We also offer a model of message diffusion that correctly predicts more rapid diffusion without clustering. We show an interaction effect of network structure and communication technologies. A remarkable result is that restricted communication is quite effective in a network stag hunt but not in our extended game.

We measure the prevalence of discrimination between Jordanian host and Syrian refugee children attending school in Jordan. Using a simple sharing experiment, we find only a small degree of out-group discrimination. However, Jordanian children with Palestinian roots do not discriminate at all, suggesting that a family history of refugee status can generate solidarity with new refugees. We also find that parents’ narratives about the refugee crisis are correlated with their children's degree of out-group discrimination, particularly among Syrian refugee children, suggesting that discriminatory preferences are being transmitted through parental attitudes.