To control the deer population, state game commissions regulate the types of deer that can be legally harvested. These regulations, however, might have an unintended effect on hunting-related accidents by changing the care hunters take when firing their rifles—a moral hazard effect—or changing the composition of hunters. Using detailed data on hunting accidents and regulations in Pennsylvania counties from 1990 to 2005, we find compelling evidence that harvesting restrictions increase the care hunters take in a manner consistent with moral hazard. Thus, these regulations have a positive safety externality.

This paper empirically tests for a multidimensional separating equilibrium in contract negotiations and tests for evidence of the moral hazard inherent in many contracts. Using contract and performance data on players drafted into the National Football League from 1986 through 1991, we find evidence that players use delay to agreement and incentive clauses to reveal their private information during contract negotiations. In addition, our empirical tests of the moral hazard issue indicate that a player's effort level is influenced by the structure of his contract.