This paper analyzes the extent to which tax differences affect the use of trade credit. U.S.-owned affiliates in low-tax countries use trade credit to lend, whereas those in high-tax countries use trade credit to borrow: 10% lower local tax rates are associated with net trade credit positions that are 1.4% higher as a fraction of sales. The use of trade credit to get capital out of low-tax, low-return environments is also illustrated by the temporary repatriation tax holiday in 2005, which was used most intensively by affiliates with positive net trade credit positions.

This paper investigates how dividend taxes influence portfolio choices, using the response to the distinctive treatment of a subset of foreign dividends in the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA) of 2003. An open-economy after-tax capital asset pricing model is used to derive the hypothesis that JGTRRA should lead to a portfolio reallocation by U.S. investors toward equities in tax-favored countries. A difference-in-difference analysis that compares U.S. equity holdings in affected and unaffected countries finds a substantial portfolio reallocation toward the former. This effect cannot be explained by several potential alternative hypotheses, including differential changes to the preferences of American investors, differential changes in investment opportunities, differential time trends in investment, changed tax evasion behavior, or changes in stock prices associated (or contemporaneous) with JGTRRA.

Do corporate tax avoidance activities advance shareholder interests? This paper tests alternative theories of corporate tax avoidance using unexplained differences between income reported to capital markets and to tax authorities. OLS estimates indicate that the effect of tax avoidance on firm value is a function of firm governance, as predicted by an agency perspective on corporate tax avoidance. Instrumental variables estimates based on exogenous changes in tax regulations yield larger overall effects and reinforce the basic result, as do several robustness checks. The results suggest that the simple view of corporate tax avoidance as a transfer of resources from the state to shareholders is incomplete given the agency problems characterizing shareholder-manager relations.