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Raghuram G Rajan
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Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
The Review of Economics and Statistics (2008) 90 (4): 643–665.
Published: 01 November 2008
Abstract
View articletitled, Aid and Growth: What Does the Cross-Country Evidence Really Show?
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for article titled, Aid and Growth: What Does the Cross-Country Evidence Really Show?
We examine the effects of aid on growth in cross-sectional and panel data—after correcting for the possible bias that poorer (or stronger) growth may draw aid contributions to recipient countries. Even after this correction, we find little robust evidence of a positive (or negative) relationship between aid inflows into a country and its economic growth. We also find no evidence that aid works better in better policy or geographical environments, or that certain forms of aid work better than others. Our findings suggest that for aid to be effective in the future, the aid apparatus will have to be rethought.
Journal Articles
The Flattening Firm: Evidence from Panel Data on the Changing Nature of Corporate Hierarchies
UnavailablePublisher: Journals Gateway
The Review of Economics and Statistics (2006) 88 (4): 759–773.
Published: 01 November 2006
Abstract
View articletitled, The Flattening Firm: Evidence from Panel Data on the Changing Nature of Corporate Hierarchies
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for article titled, The Flattening Firm: Evidence from Panel Data on the Changing Nature of Corporate Hierarchies
Using a detailed database of managerial job descriptions, reporting relationships, and compensation structures in over 300 large U.S. firms, we find that firm hierarchies are becoming flatter. The number of positions reporting directly to the CEO has gone up significantly over time while the number of levels between the division heads and the CEO has decreased. More of these managers now report directly to the CEO and more are being appointed officers of the firm, reflecting a delegation of authority. Moreover, division managers who move closer to the CEO receive higher pay and greater long-term incentives, suggesting that all this is not simply a change in organizational charts with no real consequences. Importantly, flattening cannot be characterized simply as centralization or decentralization. We discuss several possible explanations that may account for some of these changes.