We evaluate health insurance reclassification risk in the Small Group Market before ACA community rating regulations. We use detailed claims and premiums data from a large insurance company, controlling non parametrically for selection. We find a pass-through of 11% from changes in health risk to changes in premiums, with a stronger equilibrium relationship between the two. The pricing patterns are consistent with the insurer offering “guaranteed renewability” contracts with one-sided pricing commitment. The observed pricing policy adds 55% of the consumer welfare gain from community rating relative to experience rating, with welfare gains limited because of switching across insurance companies.

We analyze dynamic incentives in pension systems created by the use of a small set of final years of earnings to compute benefits. Using social security records and household surveys from Uruguay, we show that self-employed workers and some employees of small firms respond to these incentives by increasing reported earnings in the benefit calculation window. We find evidence that suggests that these responses are explained by changes in earnings reporting and not in total earnings or labor supply. Back-of-the-envelope calculations indicate that this behavior increases the cost of pensions by about 0.2% of the GDP.