As in other OECD countries, women in New Zealand earn substantially less than men with similar observable characteristics. In this paper, we use fifteen years of linked employer-employee data to examine different explanations for this gender wage gap. We find an overall gender wage gap between 20% and 28%, of which gender differences in sorting across occupations explain 9%, across industries 16% to 19%, and across firms 5% to 9%, respectively. The remaining within-firm gender wage gap is still between 13% and 17%. Around 5 percentage points of this are explained by women being less willing to bargain or less successful at bargaining to capture firm-specific rents. Gender differences in productivity also explain at most 4.5 percentage points of this remaining gap. These results suggest that taste discrimination is also important for explaining why women are paid less than their relative contribution to firm output. Across-industry and over-time variation in the gender wage-productivity gap further support this conclusion.

We use a migration lottery program to overcome the double-selectivity problems posed by migration. We compare a wide range of outcomes for the remaining household members of Tongan emigrants with those of members of similar households who were unsuccessful in the lottery, with the policy rules determining which household members can move. Multiple hypothesis testing procedures are used to examine robustness. The overall impact on households left behind is largely negative in terms of resource availability, and both sources of selectivity matter, leading studies that fail to address them adequately to misrepresent the impact of migration on households.

Bigger firms pay higher wages. This note reports tests of the hypothesis that this big-firm premium (BFP) occurs because workers in big firms are more skilled. We use the International Adult Literacy Survey, which gives richer skill measures than those typically available in labor market surveys, to measure the BFP in nine countries with and without controls for worker skill. The results show that the BFP is not as universal as is often suggested, but in countries where it exists controlling for skills does little to reduce the size of the BFP.