Table 3 shows the results for party secretaries. Columns (1)–(4) show the (logarithmic) results for the increase in land supply and Columns (5)–(8) show those for land sales revenue. For all eight columns, we find strongly significant upward trends during the party secretaries’ tenures. All quadratic-term coefficients are negative but insignificant, which suggests a very slight concavity in the rising trend. Table 4 shows the results for mayors. The increases in land supply also show significant rising trends with the exception of industrial land. The results on land revenue is much weaker, except that the coefficient for residential land remains significant. All linear-term coefficients for party secretaries are much larger than those for mayors. The coefficients of the controls are mostly insignificant, likely because the prefecture-leader fixed effects soak up much of the variations.
| . | ln(increase in land supply) . | ln(land sales revenue) . | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Total . | Residential . | Commercial . | Industrial . | Total . | Residential . | Commercial . | Industrial . |
| Variables . | (1) . | (2) . | (3) . | (4) . | (5) . | (6) . | (7) . | (8) . |
| years in office | 0.541*** | 0.698*** | 0.860*** | 0.807*** | 1.175*** | 1.340*** | 1.141*** | 0.900*** |
| (0.134) | (0.193) | (0.174) | (0.280) | (0.133) | (0.179) | (0.180) | (0.234) | |
| (years in office)2 | −0.00146 | 0.000407 | −0.0135 | −0.00562 | −0.00687 | −0.00718 | −0.0166 | −0.00960 |
| (0.00689) | (0.00959) | (0.0101) | (0.0114) | (0.00753) | (0.00937) | (0.0107) | (0.00976) | |
| ln(GDP increase) | 0.00243 | −0.0569 | 0.00255 | −0.0261 | −0.0373 | −0.0237 | −0.00363 | −0.0131 |
| (0.0380) | (0.0616) | (0.0744) | (0.0783) | (0.0569) | (0.0811) | (0.0764) | (0.0632) | |
| ratio of GDPs (tertiary to secondary) | −0.229 | −0.0338 | −0.773** | −0.700 | −0.349 | −0.264 | −0.451 | −0.614 |
| (0.282) | (0.420) | (0.384) | (0.614) | (0.283) | (0.390) | (0.402) | (0.515) | |
| fraction of 2-stage (total) | 0.260 | 0.287 | ||||||
| (0.225) | (0.310) | |||||||
| fraction of 2-stage (residential) | 0.384* | 0.0354 | ||||||
| (0.227) | (0.239) | |||||||
| fraction of 2-stage (commercial) | 0.675*** | 0.296 | ||||||
| (0.215) | (0.188) | |||||||
| fraction of 2-stage (industrial) | 0.568 | 0.359 | ||||||
| (0.354) | (0.373) | |||||||
| Constant | 5.411*** | 3.067*** | −0.694 | 3.691*** | 10.05*** | 9.002*** | 5.506*** | 8.615*** |
| (0.488) | (0.684) | (0.623) | (1.100) | (0.582) | (0.758) | (0.738) | (0.806) | |
| Prefecture-(Party-Secretary) FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 1,343 | 1,344 | 1,341 | 1,340 | 1,325 | 1,344 | 1,331 | 1,340 |
| R2 | 0.893 | 0.867 | 0.813 | 0.839 | 0.933 | 0.907 | 0.875 | 0.895 |
| . | ln(increase in land supply) . | ln(land sales revenue) . | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Total . | Residential . | Commercial . | Industrial . | Total . | Residential . | Commercial . | Industrial . |
| Variables . | (1) . | (2) . | (3) . | (4) . | (5) . | (6) . | (7) . | (8) . |
| years in office | 0.541*** | 0.698*** | 0.860*** | 0.807*** | 1.175*** | 1.340*** | 1.141*** | 0.900*** |
| (0.134) | (0.193) | (0.174) | (0.280) | (0.133) | (0.179) | (0.180) | (0.234) | |
| (years in office)2 | −0.00146 | 0.000407 | −0.0135 | −0.00562 | −0.00687 | −0.00718 | −0.0166 | −0.00960 |
| (0.00689) | (0.00959) | (0.0101) | (0.0114) | (0.00753) | (0.00937) | (0.0107) | (0.00976) | |
| ln(GDP increase) | 0.00243 | −0.0569 | 0.00255 | −0.0261 | −0.0373 | −0.0237 | −0.00363 | −0.0131 |
| (0.0380) | (0.0616) | (0.0744) | (0.0783) | (0.0569) | (0.0811) | (0.0764) | (0.0632) | |
| ratio of GDPs (tertiary to secondary) | −0.229 | −0.0338 | −0.773** | −0.700 | −0.349 | −0.264 | −0.451 | −0.614 |
| (0.282) | (0.420) | (0.384) | (0.614) | (0.283) | (0.390) | (0.402) | (0.515) | |
| fraction of 2-stage (total) | 0.260 | 0.287 | ||||||
| (0.225) | (0.310) | |||||||
| fraction of 2-stage (residential) | 0.384* | 0.0354 | ||||||
| (0.227) | (0.239) | |||||||
| fraction of 2-stage (commercial) | 0.675*** | 0.296 | ||||||
| (0.215) | (0.188) | |||||||
| fraction of 2-stage (industrial) | 0.568 | 0.359 | ||||||
| (0.354) | (0.373) | |||||||
| Constant | 5.411*** | 3.067*** | −0.694 | 3.691*** | 10.05*** | 9.002*** | 5.506*** | 8.615*** |
| (0.488) | (0.684) | (0.623) | (1.100) | (0.582) | (0.758) | (0.738) | (0.806) | |
| Prefecture-(Party-Secretary) FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 1,343 | 1,344 | 1,341 | 1,340 | 1,325 | 1,344 | 1,331 | 1,340 |
| R2 | 0.893 | 0.867 | 0.813 | 0.839 | 0.933 | 0.907 | 0.875 | 0.895 |
FE = fixed effects, GDP = gross domestic product.
Notes: Data on the length of terms for prefectural party secretaries and mayors are from authors' collection. GDP data are from City Statistics Yearbook. Land data are from the website of the Ministry of Land and Resources. Standard errors are clustered at the province level and shown in parentheses. A prefecture (party-secretary) fixed effect is actually a prefecture-specific, party-secretary fixed effect; that is, for each prefecture, there is a coefficient for each prefectural party secretary to account for its specificity. *** = p < .01, ** = p < .05, * = p < 0.1.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
| . | ln(increase in land supply) . | ln(land sales revenue) . | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Total . | Residential . | Commercial . | Industrial . | Total . | Residential . | Commercial . | Industrial . |
| Variables . | (1) . | (2) . | (3) . | (4) . | (5) . | (6) . | (7) . | (8) . |
| years in office | 0.163*** | 0.117* | 0.124** | −0.0479 | 0.0122 | 0.119* | −0.00214 | −0.0776 |
| (0.0512) | (0.0667) | (0.0598) | (0.0711) | (0.0502) | (0.0615) | (0.0775) | (0.0687) | |
| (years in office)2 | −0.00187 | −0.00659 | −0.0276*** | 0.00210 | −0.00379 | −0.00930 | −0.0164 | 0.00516 |
| (0.00806) | (0.00984) | (0.00906) | (0.0106) | (0.00753) | (0.00878) | (0.0120) | (0.0104) | |
| ln(GDP increase) | 0.0112 | −0.0553 | 0.0178 | −0.0207 | −0.0261 | −0.0247 | 0.0179 | −0.0171 |
| (0.0414) | (0.0716) | (0.0765) | (0.0835) | (0.0620) | (0.0900) | (0.0791) | (0.0747) | |
| ratio of GDPs (tertiary to secondary) | −0.0968 | 0.292 | −0.480 | −1.051 | −0.415 | −0.226 | −0.411 | −0.933 |
| (0.341) | (0.468) | (0.559) | (0.740) | (0.399) | (0.513) | (0.634) | (0.672) | |
| fraction of 2-stage (total) | 0.0800 | 0.0893 | ||||||
| (0.244) | (0.290) | |||||||
| fraction of 2-stage (residential) | 0.299 | −0.0297 | ||||||
| (0.245) | (0.238) | |||||||
| fraction of 2-stage (commercial) | 0.649*** | 0.269 | ||||||
| (0.206) | (0.194) | |||||||
| fraction of 2-stage (industrial) | 1.204** | 0.998 | ||||||
| (0.606) | (0.611) | |||||||
| Constant | 4.803*** | 1.718*** | −2.389*** | 1.285 | 7.875*** | 6.527*** | 3.313*** | 6.208*** |
| (0.355) | (0.533) | (0.510) | (0.857) | (0.457) | (0.640) | (0.580) | (0.806) | |
| Prefecture-Mayor FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 1,343 | 1,344 | 1,341 | 1,340 | 1,325 | 1,344 | 1,331 | 1,340 |
| R2 | 0.892 | 0.867 | 0.825 | 0.844 | 0.938 | 0.911 | 0.882 | 0.895 |
| . | ln(increase in land supply) . | ln(land sales revenue) . | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Total . | Residential . | Commercial . | Industrial . | Total . | Residential . | Commercial . | Industrial . |
| Variables . | (1) . | (2) . | (3) . | (4) . | (5) . | (6) . | (7) . | (8) . |
| years in office | 0.163*** | 0.117* | 0.124** | −0.0479 | 0.0122 | 0.119* | −0.00214 | −0.0776 |
| (0.0512) | (0.0667) | (0.0598) | (0.0711) | (0.0502) | (0.0615) | (0.0775) | (0.0687) | |
| (years in office)2 | −0.00187 | −0.00659 | −0.0276*** | 0.00210 | −0.00379 | −0.00930 | −0.0164 | 0.00516 |
| (0.00806) | (0.00984) | (0.00906) | (0.0106) | (0.00753) | (0.00878) | (0.0120) | (0.0104) | |
| ln(GDP increase) | 0.0112 | −0.0553 | 0.0178 | −0.0207 | −0.0261 | −0.0247 | 0.0179 | −0.0171 |
| (0.0414) | (0.0716) | (0.0765) | (0.0835) | (0.0620) | (0.0900) | (0.0791) | (0.0747) | |
| ratio of GDPs (tertiary to secondary) | −0.0968 | 0.292 | −0.480 | −1.051 | −0.415 | −0.226 | −0.411 | −0.933 |
| (0.341) | (0.468) | (0.559) | (0.740) | (0.399) | (0.513) | (0.634) | (0.672) | |
| fraction of 2-stage (total) | 0.0800 | 0.0893 | ||||||
| (0.244) | (0.290) | |||||||
| fraction of 2-stage (residential) | 0.299 | −0.0297 | ||||||
| (0.245) | (0.238) | |||||||
| fraction of 2-stage (commercial) | 0.649*** | 0.269 | ||||||
| (0.206) | (0.194) | |||||||
| fraction of 2-stage (industrial) | 1.204** | 0.998 | ||||||
| (0.606) | (0.611) | |||||||
| Constant | 4.803*** | 1.718*** | −2.389*** | 1.285 | 7.875*** | 6.527*** | 3.313*** | 6.208*** |
| (0.355) | (0.533) | (0.510) | (0.857) | (0.457) | (0.640) | (0.580) | (0.806) | |
| Prefecture-Mayor FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 1,343 | 1,344 | 1,341 | 1,340 | 1,325 | 1,344 | 1,331 | 1,340 |
| R2 | 0.892 | 0.867 | 0.825 | 0.844 | 0.938 | 0.911 | 0.882 | 0.895 |
FE = fixed effects, GDP = gross domestic product.
Notes: Data on the length of terms for prefectural party secretaries and mayors are from authors' collection. GDP data are from City Statistics Yearbook. Land data are from the website of the Ministry of Land and Resources. Standard errors are clustered at the province level and shown in parentheses. A prefecture (mayor) fixed effect is actually a prefecture-specific, mayor fixed effect; that is, for each prefecture, there is a coefficient for each prefectural mayor to account for its specificity. *** = p < .01, ** = p < .05, * = p < 0.1.
Source: Authors’ calculations.